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A NOTE ON RAIL TRANSIT COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: DO NON-USER BENEFITS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
A transportation program for the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area must be both adaptable and realistic. … Urban planning is being subjected to much critical appraisal today, particularly as a result of the impact of rapidly changing technology in transportation.
Most of the transport planning for the older metropolitan centers, with their highly concentrated central business districts, projects a continuation to 1980 of past trends, with particular emphasis on the central business district and the need to preserve its present status and function. Even in Los Angeles, with its radically different structure, this objective seems to be the prime motivation of the proponents of rapid transit. Their planning savors of an endeavor to turn back the clock to an earlier period of transport technology, ignoring thereby the developments of the past forty years. Unless the centrifugal influence of transportation can be eliminated or severely restricted, the rapid transit scheme will most likely be futile, and it will certainly be expensive. (Dudley F. Pegrum, 1964, pp 41-42) Prof Pegrum was right about Los Angeles and also about the other U.S. metropolitan areas.
They are all in the automobile age; they are all subject to auto-oriented development; none of them are subject to significant refashioning via the introduction of high capacity rail transit systems. As incomes rise, people everywhere prefer the range and mobility of personal transportation. And as more people own cars, origins and destinations disperse. Then as cities spread out, the demand for cars is boosted -and the demand for transit falls. It is no surprise that the plurality of commuting in the U.S. has been suburb-to-suburb, since at least 2000 (Pisarski, 2007) . Notes: (1) Personal vehicle and public transport market shares from http://www.publicpurpose.com/ut-usptshare45.pdf;
(2) National transit use data may be misleading because the New York City transit system accounts for about one-third of the nation's urban bus riders and about two thirds of the nation's rail transit riders (Winston, 2010) Various studies over the last 30 years have reached a similar conclusion. The performance of many of the recent U.S. rail transit systems is again analyzed in the pages that follow, but unlike the previous studies, we attempt to include non-user benefits in our cost-benefit analysis. We show that it makes very little difference. These transit systems remain uneconomic across the board.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
One of the earliest studies of actual vs. promised performance for U.S. post-WW-II-vintage rail transit systems was by Don Pickrell (1992) . He analyzed eight heavy-rail projects (Washington DC, Atlanta, Baltimore, Miami) and eight light-rail projects (Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Portland, Sacramento). Pickrell reported across-the-board ridership shortfalls. "Only Washington's extensive Metrorail system experiences actual ridership that is more than one-half of its forecast." (p. 160) Looking for system-wide impacts (how many new-to-transit riders), Pickrell noted, "… actual ridership on bus and rail service together is below its forecast level in six of seven urban areas, most often by a substantial margin. (Baltimore had no forecast of total ridership.)" (p. 161). There were similar disappointments when actual vs. forecast costs were compared. On the cost theme, Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002) considered nineteen North American rail projects and found that, " [F] or rail projects, actual costs are on average 41% higher than estimated costs (sd=37)." (p. 290). Baum-Snow and Kahn (2005) The most recent U.S. rail transit study is by O'Toole (2010) . He assembled data for seventy transit systems, including automated guideway, cable car, commuter rail, heavy rail, light rail and streetcar. The author carried out six tests (profitability, ridership, "cost-effectiveness," "cable car test … do rail lines perform as well as cable cars?", economic development test, transportation network test) but found that, "No system passes all of these tests, and in fact few of them pass any of the tests at all." (p. 1) O'Toole defined "cost-efficiency" as "… the number of buses needed to provide equivalent service to the rail lines …" (p. 9).
A COST-BENEFIT TEST
In this study, we analyzed 34 U.S post-WW II-vintage rail transit systems, eight commuter rail (CR), six heavy rail (HR) and 20 light rail (LR). We applied a standard benefit-cost test, whereby capital costs are annualized and combined with annual data for each line. The basic data are shown in Table A1a of the Appendix. We used the capital cost data for each line as reported by O'Toole and applied all of the other required data from the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) National Transit Data Base. We restricted the analysis to cases for which data from both sources were available. All dollar values were converted to 2009 dollars.
Capital costs were annualized in the manner recommended by the FTA. They suggest a seven percent per annum capitalization rate.
1 To be sure, Tom Rubin (2010) reminded us that these systems actually incur capital expenditures every year for renewal and replacement of existing transit systems. This is an important caveat to the presumption that we have captured all of the capital costs. Taking the aggregate of FTA's reported transit system capital expenditures for any one year is a useful approach if a system-by-system analysis is not required. In that case, the analyst presumes that the various systems in the sample are at various stages of their life cycle and the sum of all of the capital expenditures for that year is an accurate reflection of that year's system-wide capital costs.
Annual passenger boardings and annual operating expenditures for each of the 34 systems were available from the FTAs National Transit Data Base. Average trip lengths and average fares for the three rail transit types were calculated from American Public Transit Association data and shown in Appendix Table A2 .
We augmented these conventional measures by attempting to account for non-user benefits.
These would be due to auto trips avoided by any new-to-transit passengers. While most riders on new rail transit systems were former bus users, Rubin's compilation of new-rider percentages in recent "new starts" rail transit applications suggests that slightly more than 25 percent can be assumed to be new-to-transit. With no more specific data available, we assumed that each of these boardings was a substitute for an equal-distance auto trip. We then applied the recent Parry-Small (2009) estimates of auto externality costs. These authors estimated that peak-hour and off-peak externality costs (cents per passenger mile) for
Washington, DC, were 25 cents and 6 cents, respectively. These were the sum of congestion costs plus pollution and accident costs less fuel taxes. The corresponding costs for Los
Angeles were 31 cents and 8 cents, respectively. We did not have peak vs. off-peak trip diversion breakdowns and adopted 20 cents per automobile passenger-mile avoided as the average non-rider benefit.
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The results in the upper-right corner of Table 1 are not reassuring. We show the weighted averages of losses per passenger round-trip for the three types of rail transit studied in light of our effort to include non-user benefits. The weights are annual unlinked trips. On average, commuter rail costs society $42 per round-trip while heavy rail and light rail cost society $17 and $20 per boarding, respectively. (The ranges for this index, shown in Table A1b , are quite large.)
In the lower left quadrant, we double the estimates of externality benefits, but the loss mitigations are small. The other two quadrants show results for a doubling of 2008 ridership and with the same two externality benefit assumptions. These assumptions cut the losses, but as we have emphasized at the beginning, such ridership levels are extremely unlikely in modern dispersed cities. Filion and McSpurren (2007) : "A supportive distribution of residential density is perceived to be an essential component of strategies aimed at increasing the use of public transit. To alter substantially land use-transport dynamics in a fashion that favours public transit patronage, residential density policies must be deployed over long periods and unfold at local and metropolitan levels simultaneously." (p. 501)
But it is unclear how feasible or how costly it is to somehow reverse market forces. The latest available data for U.S. metropolitan areas shows that suburbanization trends continue. 4 This is in spite of the fact that New Urbanist plans have been popular in much of this country for at least a quarter century.
CONCLUSIONS
It is well known that U.S. rail transit systems do not cover costs. Ridership is too low and/or costs are too high. The weighted average annual operating deficits in our sample were $21 million for the eight commuter rail systems, $329 for the six heavy rail systems and $48 million for the 20 light rail systems. Accounting for annualized capital costs makes these shortfalls much worse.
We have shown that accounting for non-user benefits does nothing to modify the assessment that introducing rail transit systems into modern cities cannot be justified on economic grounds.
To be sure, any cost-benefit analysis leaves out various difficult-to-quantify intangibles. Rail transit advocates and various city boosters often mention how the "worldliness" or aura of their city would benefit from a world-class subway system. That is not our topic here, but we have shown that such intangibles face a huge hurdle if they are to overcome the large economic losses we have documented. Tables 1,2, 42 
